Preventing an \u3cem\u3eEx Machina\u3c/em\u3e Future: Search Engine Speech and the Advisor Theory by Pettyjohn, Luke
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
Volume 14 | Issue 3 Article 5
3-1-2016
Preventing an Ex Machina Future: Search Engine
Speech and the Advisor Theory
Luke Pettyjohn
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in First Amendment
Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Luke Pettyjohn, Preventing an Ex Machina Future: Search Engine Speech and the Advisor Theory, 14 First Amend. L. Rev. 462 (2018).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr/vol14/iss3/5
PREVENTING AN EX MA CHINA FUTURE: SEARCH
ENGINE SPEECH AND THE ADVISOR THEORY
LUKE PETTYJOHN*
Here's the weird thing about search engines. It was like
striking oil in a world that hadn't invented internal
combustion. Too much raw material. Nobody knew
what to do with it.... [Tihey were fixated on sucking it
up and monetizing via shopping and social media.
They thought that search engines were a map of what
people were thinking. But actually they were a map of
how people were thinking. Impulse. Response. Fluid.
Imperfect. Patterned. Chaotic.'
1. INTRODUCTION
This observation in the science fiction movie Ex Machina, al-
lows Nathan, the CEO of a search engine company, to create artificial
intelligence in a humanoid robot called Ava. Under the guise of win-
ning an employee lottery, Nathan brings Caleb, "the most talented
coder in [his] company," to his remote estate. 2 Caleb's task is to de-
termine whether Ava "can truly think, and even feel, for herself. If
so, she will represent . . . 'the greatest scientific event in the history
of man.' 3 Through a series of interviews, Ava demonstrates the
mastery of her programming, which incorporated the search queries
of every search engine user to mimic how a human would act. She
plans her own escape and manipulates Caleb to help free her from
*Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2016; Staff
Member, FirstAmendment Law Review. I would like to thank my wife, Kate
Ortbahn, and my editor, Sheldon Stokes, without whom this piece would not ex-
ist Additionally, I would like to thank my parents for their support.
I Ex MACHINA (Film4 & DNA Films 2015).
2 Anthony Lane, Feelings: "Ex Machina" and "About Elly," NEW YORKER, (Apr. 13,
2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/13/feelings-cinema-
anthony-lane.
3 Id. (quoting movie Ex MACHINA (Film4 & DNA Films 2015)).
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Nathan's controlling grasp. Though the movie contains other techno-
logical feats requiring a willing suspension of disbelief, such as Ava's
hard drive/brain, accepting the rapidly growing power of search en-
gines does not. The ending of Ex Machina may be clear, but the future
of search engines and their influence on humanity remains clouded.
Twenty years ago, search engines performed the barest of
functions. They compiled lists of "ten blue links" that were direct re-
sults of users' exact search criteria.4 There were no results that had
been paid for by web sites.5 But by 2009, search engines had decid-
ed "people don't really want to search" like librarians browsing trays
of index cards; they want quick access to the information they seek.6
Search engines thus began to "rank results based only on what the
most relevant answers are for users."7 Search engines now tell us
what we are really looking for, completing queries as we type, cor-
recting typos, and "showing results for" what we actually intended to
search.8 It does not require science fiction to see how the power of
search engines, as protected by the First Amendment, is slipping be-
yond governmental control.
Courts and scholars have put forth two competing theories
for categorizing the actions of search engines: the conduit theory and
the editor theory.9 This Note attempts to outline a third, recently
proposed theory of search, the advisor theory,10 to determine
4 Christopher Ratcliff, 10 Blue Links: Are They Alive or Dead in Search?,
ECONSULTANCY (Jan. 30, 2014), https://econsultancy.com/blog/64228-10-blue-
links-are-they-dead-or-alive-in-search/.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Amit Singhal, Setting the Record Straight- Competition in Search, GOOGLE PUB.
POL'Y BLOG (June 8, 2012),
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2012/06/setting-record-straight-
competition-in.html.
8 When attempting to search for "the mew yorker," Google will return with
"Showing results for the new yorker" and give the user the opportunity to
"search instead for" what was actually typed.
9 See James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REv. 868 (2014). Each
theory will be addressed substantively in Part IV.
10 For a complete understanding of the advisor theory, see Grimmelman, supra
note 9, which introduced the theory for the first time and applied it to search
bias cases, but left open the opportunity to apply the theory to other First
Amendment situations.
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whether, the actions of search engines are deserving of First
Amendment protection. This piece ultimately suggests that courts
must employ the advisor theory and begin to view search through
the eyes of search users, rather than websites or search engines,
when deciding whether search engine functions constitute protected
speech.
Part II outlines the lineage of search engine speech from the
early American newspaper industry through today. Part III introduc-
es two of the most recent cases where the First Amendment acted to
protect speech produced by search engines. Part IV describes the
two theories that litigants have advanced to categorize the services
that search engines provide, and explains their shortcomings. Part V
introduces the more recently proposed advisor theory, explains how
the theory would apply to the two cases introduced in Part III, and
elaborates on the implications of a failure to adopt it.
II. THE LINEAGE OF SEARCH ENGINE SPEECH
A. First Amendment Foundations of Search Engine Speech
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guar-
antees freedom of expression by prohibiting Congress from restrict-
ing the press or the rights of individuals to speak freely." The First
Amendment protections that search engine search results enjoy find
their genesis in the newspaper industry as a result of editorial judg-
ment.12 The fact that editorial judgment concerns speech by the
press, an institutional speaker, "was understood . . . at the time the
First Amendment was ratified, for the press was even then seen as
playing a systematic role in democratic society."' 3 As a general mat-
ter, "the Government may not interfere with the editorial judgments
of private speakers on issues of public concern-that is, it may not
tell a private speaker what to include or not to include in speech
11 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12 Randall P. Bezanson, The Developing Law of EditorialJudgment, 78 NEB. L. REV.
754, 757 (1999).
13 Id.
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about matters of public concern." 14 That rule is not however, "re-
stricted to the press, being enjoyed by business corporations gener-
ally and by ordinary people engaged in unsophisticated expression
as well as by professional publishers."15 Further, First Amendment
protections apply "whether or not a speaker articulates, or even has,
a coherent or precise message, and whether or not the speaker gen-
erated the underlying content in the first place." 16
The Supreme Court chose to address the issue of governmen-
tal interference with the editorial judgment of a newspaper in Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.17 In that case, Tornillo, a candidate
for the Florida House of Representatives, sought to force Miami Her-
ald Publishing Company to print a reply to an editorial it had pub-
lished that was critical of his candidacy.' 8 Tornillo based his claim
on Florida's "right of reply" statute that "grant[ed] a political candi-
date a right to equal space to answer criticism and attacks on his
record by a newspaper, and ma[de] it a misdemeanor for the news-
paper to fail to comply."' 9 The Court held that while the statute "did
not censor speech in the traditional sense," 20 requiring newspapers
to grant access to the message of others "imposed an impermissible
content-based burden on newspaper speech."21 Such a burden re-
sulted because, in effect, the statute deterred newspapers "from
speaking in unfavorable terms about political candidates" and "in-
duced the newspaper to respond to the candidates' replies when it
might have preferred to remain silent." 22 Both prevented the news-
14 Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 437 (2014) (citing Snyder v.
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451-52 (2011)).
1s Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
574 (1995).
16]ian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 437 (citing Zalewska v. Cty. of Sullivan, N.Y., 316
F.3d 314, 319 (2d Cir. 2003)).
17 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 436.
21 Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 653 (1994).
22 Id at 654.
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paper from exercising its First Amendment right to exercise "editori-
al control and judgment." 23
The Supreme Court reinforced and extended that principle
beyond the newspaper context in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Les-
bian, & Bisexual Group of Boston.24 In Hurley, a group of individualS 25
"authorized by the city of Boston to organize and conduct the St. Pat-
rick's Day-Evacuation Day Parade . . . refused a place in the 1993
event" to the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Bos-
ton, a group that wished "to express its members' pride in their Irish
heritage as openly gay, lesbian and bisexual individuals."26 The issue
was whether Massachusetts could "require private citizens who or-
ganize a parade to include among the marchers a group imparting a
message the organizers do not wish to convey."27 According to the
Court, allowing the state to do so would "violate[] the fundamental
rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the
autonomy to choose the content of his own message." 28 The Court
further explained, "'[S]ince all speech inherently involves choices
about what to say and what to leave unsaid,' one important manifes-
tation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to
speak may also decide 'what not to say."' 29 The Court found that
principle applied "even though the parade organizers did not them-
selves create the floats and other displays that formed the parade
and were 'rather lenient in admitting participants." 30 Further, a pri-
vate speaker "does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by
combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to
isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the
23]ian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 436 (quoting Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)).
24 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
25 The group was the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council which was an
unincorporated association of individuals elected from various veterans groups.
Id. at 557.
2 6
1d
27 Id. at 559.
28 Id. at 573.
29 Id. (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 11, 16
(1986)).
30 ian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. at 437 (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569).
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speech."31 For that matter, "nor ... does First Amendment protec-
tion require a speaker to generate . . . each item featured in the
communication." 32
B. Applying the First Amendment to Search Engine Speech
Few courts have been tasked with deciding the issue. of
whether search engine search results constitute speech.33 The term
"search results" typically refers to the list created by search engines
in response to a query.34 One of the very first cases that presented
the issue was Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech, Inc.35 In that case,
Search King, a web site, brought an action for tortious interference
with contractual relations against Google, which ranked web sites.36
Search King alleged that Google maliciously decreased the ranking it
had previously assigned to Search King.37 The specific question at
issue was "whether a representation of the relative significance of a
web site as it corresponds to a search query is a form of protected
speech."38 Search King asserted a single cause of action: tortious in-
terference with contractual relations. 39 Both Search King and Google
31 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569-70.
32Id
33 At the time ian Zhang was decided, "only two courts appear[ed] to have ad-
dressed the question, both concluding (albeit with somewhat sparse analysis)
that search engine results are indeed protected by the First Amendment." 10 F.
Supp. 3d at 436 (citing Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del.
2007); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech, Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL
21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003)).
34 Search Result, SEARCHMETRICS,
http://www.searchmetrics.com/glossary/search-result/ (last visited Feb. 20,
2016).
3s No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
36 Id. Google's search ranking was "controlled by a mathematical algorithm. One
component of Google's mathematical algorithm produce[d] a 'PageRank,' . . . a
numerical representation of the relative significance of a particular web site as
it corresponds to a search query." Id. Search King's suit arose because its "Pag-
eRank" was reduced or devalued and, while Google did not sell PageRanks, the
reduction of Search King's "PageRank" led to a loss in its advertising revenue.
Id.
37 Id.
38 Search King, 2003 WL 21464568, at *1.
3 9 Id at *2.
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conceded that the case turned on Search King's ability to demon-
strate that "the interference was malicious and wrongful, and was
not justified, privileged, or excusable." 40 Google asserted that its ac-
tions could not be considered wrongful because the rankings of pag-
es 41 constituted opinions protected by the First Amendment.42 To
support that proposition, Google relied on Jefferson County Sch. Dist
No. R-1 v. Moody's Investor's Services, Inc.,43 a case holding that "First
Amendment protection extended to a financial rating service's unfa-
vorable review of the value of a school district's refunding bonds.""
The court found the Jefferson County case analogous to the case at
hand and ultimately held that the rankings of pages were "subjective
result[s]" that constituted "constitutionally protected opinions" "en-
titled to full constitutional protection." 45
Four years later, Langdon v. Google, Inc.46 was decided. In
that case, the District Court for the District of Delaware "refused to
order Google and Microsoft to prominently list [Langdon's] site in
their search results."47 Langdon, the plaintiff, owned two websites:
www.NCJusticeFraud.com and www.ChinalsEvil.com. 48 The purpose
of the first was to "expose[] fraud perpetrated by various North Car-
olina government officials and employees, including . . . the North
Carolina Attorney General .. . ."'49 The second website was intended
to "delineate[ atrocities committed by the Chinese government."50
Langdon's complaint alleged that the search engine defendants re-
fused to run ads on his sites and that this violated his First Amend-
40 Id
41 In that case, the search results came in the form of PageRanks, a component
of the larger search engine's mathematical algorithm, which is a "numerical
representation of the relative significance of a particular web site as it corre-
sponds to a search query." Id. at *1.
42 1d
43 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999).
44 Search King, 2003 WL 21464568, at *2 (citing id. at 852-55).
45 Id. at *4; Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection
for Search Engine Results, 8 J.L. EcoN. & POL'Y 883 (2012).
46 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007).
4 7 Volokh & Falk, supra note 45, at 886.
4 Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 626.
50 Id.
soId.
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ment rights, inter alia.51 For relief, Langdon sought to have the de-
fendants place his ads for his websites "in prominent places on their
search engine results and . . . 'honestly' rank [his] websites." 52
Google argued that "such relief would compel it to speak in a manner
deemed appropriate by [Langdon] and would prevent Google from
speaking in ways that [he] dislikes."5 3 The court reasoned: "The
First Amendment guarantees an individual the right to free speech,
'a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and
what not to say.' . .. [T]he injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff contra-
venes Defendants' First Amendment rights."5 4 Harking back to the
protections afforded newspapers55 the court held that "search en-
gines cannot be forced to include links that they wish to exclude."56
III. RECENT LITIGATION: THE CONTEXT AND CHARACTERS
A. Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc.
In ian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc.,5 7 "a group of New York resi-
dents who advocate for increased democracy in China sue[d] one of
China's largest companies, Baidu, Inc. ('Baidu')."58 The plaintiffs in
that case contended that Baidu unlawfully blocked "articles and oth-
er information concerning 'the Democracy movement in China"' and
related topics from its search results in the United States. 59 The
Southern District of New York concluded that, at least in the present
circumstances, the First Amendment protects as speech the results
produced by an Internet search engine.60
51 d.
52 Id. at 629.
53 Id
54 Id. at 629-30; Volokh & Falk, supra note 45, at 886.
ss See supra Part II.A.
56 Volokh & Falk, supra note 45, at 886 (citing Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 630).
s7 10 F. Supp. 3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
58 Id. at 434.
s9 Id. at 434-35 (citing Compl. (Docket No. 1) ¶¶ 14, 22, 2011 WL 1884450
(S.D.N.Y.)).
60 Id. at 435.
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Baidu operates a Chinese search engine service called Bai-
du.com. 6 1 Baidu.com "'offers multiple services to locate information,
products and services using Chinese-language search terms, such as,
search by Chinese phonetics, advanced search, snapshots, spell
checker, stock quotes, news, images, video, weather, train and flight
schedules and other local information."' 62 Baidu was purported to be
the largest search engine in China, "with an estimated more than
70% share of the Chinese-language market" as of 2010.63
Plaintiffs were "self-described 'promoters of democracy in
China through their writings, publications and reporting of pro-
democracy events."' 64 They alleged that Baidu "conspire[d] to pre-
vent 'pro-democracy political speech' from appearing in its search-
engine results here in the United States."65 Each plaintiff had pub-
lished "articles, video recordings, audio recordings, or other publica-
tions regarding the democracy movement in China" on the Inter-
net.66 The publications appeared in the search results of other
search engines, such as Google and Bing, but did "not appear in Bai-
du's search results because Baidu deliberately block[ed] them."67 As
a result, the plaintiffs brought eight different claims against Baidu.68
In its analysis, the court noted that the question of "whether
search-engine results constitute speech protected by the First
Amendment has been the subject of vigorous academic debate."69 it
is a subject, however, that has received "relatively little attention"
61 1d.
62 Id. (citing Compl. ¶ 13).
63 Id. (citing Baidu, Inc. v. Registers.com, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 312, 314 (S.D.N.Y.
2010)).
64Id.
65 Id. (citing Compl. IT 7-8, 10-12, 14-16, 20).
66
Id.
67 Id
68 10 F. Supp. 3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Compl. T¶ 7-8, 10-12, 14-16, 20).
69 Id. at 436 (citing Grimmelmann, supra note 9; Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algo-
rithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445 (2013); Josh Blackman, What Happens
if Data Is Speech?, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 25 (2014)); Oren Bracha & Frank
Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the
Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L.REv. 1149 (2008); Volokh & Falk, supra note 45;
Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2013); Michael J. Ballanco,
Comment, Searching for the First Amendment: An Inquisitive Free Speech Ap-
proach to Search Engine Rankings, 24 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 89 (2013).
[Vol. 14470 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
EX MA CHINA
from courts.70 In fact, "only two courts appear[ed] to have ad-
dressed the question, both concluding (albeit with somewhat sparse
analysis) that search engine results are indeed protected by the First
Amendment." 71 Further, the question was one of first impression in
that circuit. 72
Looking to Tornillo and Hurley,73 the court found that, in light
of the principles established therein, "there is a strong argument to
be made that the First Amendment fully immunizes search-engine
results from most, if not all, kinds of civil liability and government
regulation."74 The court expanded on this point:
[By] retriev[ing] relevant information from the vast
universe of data on the Internet and [organizing] it in
a way that would be most helpful to the searcher ...
search engines inevitably make editorial judgments
about what information (or kinds of information) to
include in the results and how and where to display
that information (for example, on the first page of the
search results or later). 5
In those respects, the court reasoned: "[A] 'search engine's editorial
judgment is much like many other familiar editorial judgments,' such
as the newspaper editor's judgment of which wire-service stories to
run and where to place them in the newspaper." 76 The court also
likened search engine editorial judgments to "the guidebook writer's
judgments about which attractions to mention and how to display
70 1d.
71 Id. (referring to Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007)
and Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL
21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003)).
72 
Id
73 See supra Part II.
74Jian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 438 (citing Benjamin, supra note 69, at 1458-72;
Volokh & Falk, supra note 45, at 884-92).
75 Id. (citing Eric Goldman, Search Engine bias and the Demise of Search Engine
Utopianism, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 188, 192 (2006) (concluding that "search engines
make editorial judgments just like any other media company")).
76 Id. (citing Volokh & Falk, supra note 45, at 884; Benjamin, supra note 45, at
1467-71).
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them, and Matt Drudge's judgments about which stories to link and
how prominently to feature them."77
But the fact that search engines "often collect and communi-
cate facts, as opposed to opinions," had no bearing on the court's
analysis.78 Rather, it based its rationale firmly on Supreme Court
precedent, noting "'[T]he creation and dissemination of information
are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment. Facts, after
all, are the beginning point for much of the speech that is most es-
sential to advance human knowledge and conduct human affairs."'79
The court also found the argument "that search-engine re-
sults may be produced algorithmically" to be unpersuasive for its
analysis.80 "After all, the algorithms themselves were written by
human beings" and "'inherently incorporate the search engine com-
pany engineers' judgments about what material users are most likely
to find responsive to their queries."81 Ultimately, the court was
heavily persuaded by the argument that "what is true for parades
and newspaper op-ed pages is at least as true for search engine out-
put." 82 That is so because "when search engines select and arrange
others' materials, and add the all-important ordering that causes
some materials to be displayed first and others last, they are engag-
ing in fully protected First Amendment expression - '[t]he presenta-
tion of an edited compilation of speech generated by other per-
sons.'"83
The court also declined to extend" Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC,85 to the case before it.86 In that case, cable television operators
and programmers challenged the constitutionality of the "must-
carry" provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 that required local broadcast stations to be
77 Id.
78Id.
7 Id. (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., --- U.S. --- , 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011)).
80 I
81 Id. at 438-39.
82 Id. at 439.
83 Id. (citing Volokh & Falk, supra note 45, at 891 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995))).
84 Nor did the plaintiffs in this case cite to it. Id.
85 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
86fJan Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 439.
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carried on cable systems.87 In that context, the Supreme Court "ap-
plied only intermediate scrutiny."88 The court in this case found sig-
nificant that the Supreme Court in Turner started its analysis by stat-
ing that "'[t]here can be no disagreement on an initial premise': that
cable operators, 'by exercising editorial discretion over which sta-
tions or programs to include in its repertoire' - that is, by exercising
editorial discretion over speech created by others - themselves 'en-
gage in and transmit speech' protected by the First Amendment." 89
However, the Court in Turner held that an intermediate level of scru-
tiny was appropriate for three reasons: First, the Court found that
the cable operators were nothing more than "conduit[s] for the
speech of others, transmitting it on a continuous and unedited basis
to subscribers;" 90 second, the cable operators could choose to pre-
clude some speakers, "giv[ing] rise to the Government's interest in
limiting monopolistic autonomy in order to allow for the survival of
broadcasters who might otherwise be silenced and consequently de-
stroyed;" 91 and third, because the regulations at issue did not "im-
poseD a restriction, penalty, or burden by reason of the views, pro-
grams, or stations the cable operator has selected or will select,"92
they were content neutral.93 Thus, while the Court acknowledged
"that the cable operators were engaged in speech,",it "granted lesser
protection to that speech because of its less expressive nature."94
Perhaps not considering that the court would follow the edi-
torial judgment line of analysis rather than Turner's three-prong
analysis, the plaintiffs did not realize that the theory of their claims
would be fatal. The plaintiffs in Zhang claimed that, "Baidu exer-
cise[d] editorial control over its search results on certain political
topics---namely, by disfavoring expression concerning the Democra-
87 Turner, 512 U.S. at 622-24.
88Jian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 439.
89 Id. (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 636).
90 Turner, 512 U.S. at 629.
91 Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 577 (2011).
92 Turner, 512 U.S. at 644.
93 Jian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 439.
94Id. at 439.
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cy movement in China and related subjects."95 The court framed the
plaintiffs' argument as "seek[ing] to hold Baidu liable for, and thus
punish Baidu for, a conscious decision to design its search-engine al-
gorithms to favor certain expression on core political subjects over
other expression on those same political subjects."96 It is for this
very reason that the court dismissed the suit, holding that "to allow
such a suit to proceed would plainly 'violate[] the fundamental rule
of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the au-
tonomy to choose the content of his own message."'97 The court
found this conclusion to be "compelled as much by Turner as it is by
Tornillo and Hurley."98 The plaintiffs' claims failed under Turner be-
cause "'[t]here [could] be no disagreement' that Baidu [was] 'en-
gage[d] in and transmit[ed] speech' and [was] thus 'entitled to the
protection of the speech and press provisions of the First Amend-
ment."' 99 The court found that to be true because the plaintiffs' "own
theory [was] that the company exercise[d] editorial discretion over
its search results and thereby" sought to "communicate messages on
a wide variety of topics and in a wide variety of formats."' 00
The court further found "Turner's three principal rationales
for applying a lower level of scrutiny to the must-carry cable regula-
tions" to be inapplicable in the case before it.101 Regarding the first,
"whether any search engine is a mere 'conduit' given the judgments
involved in designing algorithms to choose, rank, and sort search re-
sults" was a matter of some debate.1 02 Since the plaintiffs' "own al-
legations of censorship [made] clear that Baidu was 'more than a
passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising,"'
by alleging Baidu "purposely designs its search engine algorithms to
exclude any pro-democracy topics, articles, publications, and multi-
9s Id. at 440 (internal citations omitted).
961d
9 Id. (citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573).
98 Id.
99 Id. (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994)).
100 Id. (internal citations omitted).
10 1 Id.
102 Id. (citing Volokh & Falk, supra note 45, at 898-99).
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media coverage," the court had no trouble finding their claim "not
apt here."103
Regarding the second Turner rationale, the court found
search engine operators to "lack the physical power to silence any-
one's voices, no matter what their alleged market share may be." 104
Again, the plaintiffs shot themselves in the foot, this time with their
own publications which "[made] clear Baidu does not have the abil-
ity to block 'pro-Democracy' writings from appearing on the Internet
in this country altogether; it can only control whether it will help us-
ers find them."105 For that matter, "if a user is dissatisfied with Bai-
du's search results, he or she 'has access, with just a click of the
mouse, to Google, Microsoft's Bing, Yahoo! Search, and other general
purpose search engines, as well as to almost limitless other means of
finding content on the Internet."'106 The plaintiffs acknowledged this
in their complaint, stating that their "pro-democracy works are
widely available to the public on the Internet 'via any of the [well-
known] search engines such as Google, Yahoo, and Bing."1 07
Turner's third rationale for applying intermediate scrutiny
however, is what "put[ the final nail in the coffin" for the plaintiffs in
this case.108 In contrast with Turner, where the regulations at issue
were found to be content neutral, the plaintiffs in this case "call[ed]
upon the Court to impose a penalty on Baidu precisely because of
what it does and does not choose to say."109 The court held that "to
hold Baidu liable for its editorial judgments would contravene the
principle upon which '(o)ur political system and cultural life rest':
'that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and
beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence."' 110
The court found the plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary "wholly
unpersuasive.""'
103 Id. at 441 (citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575).
104 Id
105 Id.
10 6 Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 441 (citing Volokh & Falk, supra note 45 at 898).
10 7 Id. (citing Compl., 2011 WL 1884450 (S.D.N.Y.)).
10s Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 641).
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First, the plaintiffs asserted in a wholly conclusory manner
that Baidu wasn't speaking, but instead "engaging in discriminatory
conduct." 112 Again however, the court found this assertion to be be-
lied by the plaintiffs' "own theory of the case, which [was] that by ex-
ercising editorial discretion, Baidu favor[ed] some 'political speech'
over other 'political speech."' 113 Worse still, the court found the
plaintiffs' argument to be "indistinguishable from the argument re-
jected in Hurley."114 Just as in Hurley, "'once the expressive charac-
ter' of Baidu's search results '[were] understood, it [became] appar-
ent' that allowing Plaintiffs to sue Baidu based on the content of
those results would have 'the effect of declaring [Baidu's] speech it-
self to be the public accommodation."' 115
B. S. Louis Martin v. Google
More recently and far more tersely, a California state court in
San Francisco similarly found Google's search results to be constitu-
tionally protected activity.1 16 In S. Louis Martin v. Google,117 the
owner of CoastNews.com sued Google claiming search bias, namely,
that other search engines listed his website "among the top results
on searches for topics his site covers, such as restaurant guides for
neighborhoods in San Francisco," yet similar searches on Google
didn't list his site at all. 118 According to Martin, this made competi-
tion against Google's advertisers impossible." 9 Martin also alleged
that, after successfully signing up with Google's ad service, AdSense,
the ads for a nudist retreat he placed on his site stopped displaying
because Google believed the photographs in the ad were porno-
112 Id. (citing Compl., 2011 WL 1884450 (S.D.N.Y.)).
113 Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 441.
114 Id. at 442.
115 Id. (citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572-73).
116 S. Louis Martin v. Google, Case No. CGC-14-539972 (November 13, 2014).
117Id.
118 Beth Winegarner, Google's Search Result Ads Are Protected Speech: Judge,
LAw360 (Nov. 13, 2014, 3:23 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/596066/google-s-search-results-ads-are-
protected-speech-judge.
119Id.
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graphic.1 20 Google filed an anti-SLAPP (anti-strategic lawsuit against
public participation) motion in response.121 According to Google's
memo in support of its motion to strike, "the anti-SLAPP statute was
specifically enacted to prevent meritless suits such as this from
chilling the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech."1 22
The memo argued that Martin's claims arose "from Google's exercise
of its constitutionally protected free speech rights," where "Google's
search result order and ad placement opinions are [the] constitu-
tionally protected speech."1 23 To support that proposition, Google
relied on Zhang, Langdon, and Search King, and further analogized
those cases to Blatty v. N.Y. Times Co.124 In Blatty, the California Su-
preme Court did not allow a book publisher to sue the New York
Times for excluding it from the best-seller list because "the creation
of the best-seller list was expression protected under the First
Amendment." 125 Relying on that notion, Google claimed that its
"search results express Google's opinion on which websites are most
likely to be helpful to the user in response to a query and are thus
fully protected by the First Amendment." 126 Google further claimed
that its "decisions as to whether or not to place advertisements on a
particular website also involve editorial discretion and are thus fully
protected by the First Amendment."127 To bolster this claim, Google
argued that Martin's "complaint itself demonstrate[d] that Google's
conduct at issue ... took place in a public forum and [was] connected
with issues of public interest." Martin had alleged that Google, "by
exercising its right to choose where it places third-party advertise-
1 2 0 Id.
121 S. Louis Martin v. Google, Case No. CGC-14-539972 (June 17, 2014). Califor-
nia's anti-SLAPP statute provides for a special motion to strike a complaint
where the complaint arises from activity exercising the right of free speech. CAL.
Civ. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2015).
122 See Defendant's Memo of Points and Authorities ISO Mot. To Strike Com-
plaint, Martin v. Google (2014), (No. CGC-14-5399972), 2014 WL 6478945.
1 2 3 Id.
124 42 Cal. 3d 1033, 1048 (1986).
125 Defendant's Memo of Points and Authorities ISO Mot. To Strike Complaint,
Martin v. Google (2014), (No. CGC-14-5399972), 2014 WL 6478945. Case No.
CGC-14-5399972.
126 Id.
127 Id.
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ments on websites such as [Martin's] is engaging, in a 'holy war
against certain words."' 128 Google argued that the opposite in fact is
true because Martin's suit sought "to alter Google's speech so that
[Martin's] own interests [were] served rather than those of Google
users." 129 The court agreed-with Google's assertion that Martin's
suit "challenge[d] Google's constitutionally protected speech," 30
"thereby shifting the burden to [Martin] to demonstrate a probability
of prevailing on the merits of the Complaint," which he failed to
do.131
IV. A GROWING THREAT: THE FAILURE OF THE CURRENT THEORIES
Historically, there have been two competing theories ad-
vanced to categorize search engines and the services they provide:
the conduit theory and the editor theory.1 32 While proponents of
each theory claim to have users' interests at heart, neither side can
come to any agreement over how best to help them.133 Ironically,
those "who start off talking about what would be best for users find
themselves drawn ... to one of these decidedly non-user-centric the-
ories of search."1 34 Accordingly, before presenting the advisor theo-
ry as a possible solution and showing how it would apply in practice,
it is important to delineate the "implicit assumptions made by these
other theories." 135
A. The Conduit Theory
The conduit theory argues that search engines exist "to carry
the speech of others;" 136 they have "little or no speech interest[s] of
[their] own."137 The conduit theory favors objectivity and "focuses
128 Id. (citing Compl. ¶ 7).
129 Id.
131 Order Granting Defendant Google, Inc. to Strike Plaintiffs Complaint Pursu-
ant to Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16.
132 See Grimmelmann, supra note 9, at 879.
1 33 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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on what the search does."138 Individual websites rely on the conduit
theory to argue that, since search engines "exist[ to help speakers
reach audiences," the law should prevent search engines from preju-
dicially using their power to censor websites.139 Because it looks at
search from the eyes of individual websites, the conduit theory sees
search engine bias as inherently evil, as it "systematically and unfair-
ly discriminate[s] against certain individuals or groups of individuals
in favor of others."140 It is exactly this bias, however, on which the
editor theory relies.
B. The Editor Theory
The editor theory argues that "search engines are 'media
companies' that make 'editorial choices' about what to publish."141 It
views search through the eyes of the search engine, favors subjectivi-
ty, and focuses "on what search says."142 Just as Yahoo! claimed in
2009 that "people don't really want to search,"' 43 a Google engineer
stated in 2011 that "in some sense when people come to Google,
that's exactly what they're asking for - our editorial judgment."144
And that is what the editor theory relies on: the view that search re-
sults are "'editorial judgments' about which websites might be of in-
terest to users."145  -
Under the editor theory, search engines are without a doubt
speakers because they: (1) convey information that they have pre-
pared or compiled; (2) "direct users to material created by others, by
136 Id. at 881.
37Id. at 889.
1 3 8Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 884 (quoting Batya Friedman & Helena Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer
Systems, 14 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. Sys. 330, 332 (1996)).
141 Id. at 885 (quoting Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of
Search Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 188, 189 (2006)).
142 Id. at 889.
143 Ratcliff, supra note 4.
144 Id. at 885 (quoting Steven Levy, TED 2011: The 'Panda' that Hates Farms: A
Q&A with Google's Top Search Engineers, WIRED NEWS (Mar. 3, 2011, 1:36 PM),
http://www.wired.com/business/2011/03/the-panda-that-hates-farms/all/).
145 Id.
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referencing the titles of Web pages that the search engines judge to
be most responsive to the query, coupled with short excerpts from
each page;" and (3) "select and sort the results in a way that is aimed
at giving users what the search engine companies see as the most
helpful and useful information." 146 The third distinction is the most
valuable of the three because it "is how each search engine company
tries to keep users coming back to it rather than to its competi-
tors."14 7, Eugene Volokh states that the "selection and sorting is a
mix of science and art" because, while "sophisticated computerized
algorithms" are employed, the "algorithms themselves inherently in-
corporate the search engine company engineers' judgments about
what material users are most likely to find responsive to their que-
ries."148 For this reason, Volokh claims that search engine editorial
judgment is analogous to "many other familiar editorial judgments,"
such as newspapers, guidebooks, and compilation news websites
such as DrudgeReport.com, because each must decide "[o]ut of the
thousands of possible items that could be included, which to include,
and how to arrange those that are included." 149 Volokh claims that
these "judgments are all, at their core, editorial judgments about
what users are likely to find interesting and valuable. And all these
exercises of editorial judgment are fully protected by the First
Amendment." 150 Accordingly, in search bias cases, when "the conduit
theory [meets] the editor theory,... the editor theory [wins]." 151 But
both the conduit and editor theories view search through a distorted
lens; they fail to consider what search looks like through the eyes of
the user.
V. A NEW HOPE: THE ADVISOR THEORY
To consider search through the eyes of the user, a new ap-
proach must be employed. Though the conduit and editor theories
146 Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for
Search Engine Search Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 883, 884 (2012).
147 Id.
148MI.
149 Id. at 885.
1so Id.
151 Grimmelman, supra note 9, at 911.
[Vol. 14480 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
2016] EX MACHINA 481
"differ on the details," both are speaker-centric, attempting to "iden-
tify the best information sources and make sure they can be heard
through the cacophony."1 52 The conduit theory is concerned that
"valuable and deserving speakers will be drowned out unless they
have [the] search engines' help," and the editor theory "sets up
search engines as experts in identifying the best and most useful in-
formation."153 Both "try to solve the problem of noise by amplifying
good speech."' 5 4 But search is "the single most listener-directed"
way that speakers and listeners can find each other.155 Accordingly,
an alternate approach to categorizing speech must be employed to
effectively consider search through the eyes (or ears) of the user: the
advisor theory.
A. The Advisor Theory
Unlike newspapers, radios, and televisions, search engines
are interactive. 156 Their results are not pre-programmed but "gen-
erated 'on the fly,' in response to a user's specific query."1 57 Having
performed one search, a user may use a search engine to perform
another.related search, refining the query "by entering modified or
additional keywords, seeing how this changes the results."158 Once
satisfied with the results, the user "goes off to a website or websites
to attend to their speech."' 59 In this way, "search results are advice:
suggestions about which websites the user should consult."1 60 View-
ing search results as suggestions or advice combines the two main
goals of the conduit and editor theories: the connecting of websites
and users via search engines expressing judgments about those web-
sites.161 Viewing search through the eyes of the user suggests that
152Id. at 894.
1sa Id
Is54d.
155 Id
156 Id. at 895.
Is5 Id.
1s8 Id.
159 Id.
16o1d.
1st Id.
the conduit and editor theories are not actually in opposition, but ra-
ther two sides of the same coin.162 "Search engines connect websites
and users by expressing judgments about websites."163 This sug-
gests that search engines should be characterized as "helpful, trust-
worthy advisor[s]."164  I
The advisor theory puts users' interests first and "defers to
users' choices in defining those interests." 165 It does not focus on
what search does or says, but how users search. Under the advisor
theory, users are active listeners.166 Putting the users' interests first
promotes autonomy.167 Users are able to "choose appropriate ac-
tions for achieving [their] goals," which supports the fundamental
right to "seek" information. 168 This seeking does not involve "mere
access to raw information, but also the ability to sort through it." 169
The conduit and editor theories are handicapped by their reliance on
the websites and search engines "to know what is best for [the] us-
ers."170 The advisor theory understands that "users themselves are
better placed to know what they want and need than anyone else
is:" 171 To further support autonomy, users' goals, along with the
means to pursue them, must be self-chosen. 172 Accordingly, access
to information sought is of paramount importance to' autonomy be-
cause informational equality, diversity, and efficiency all stem from
it.173 To support this end, the advisor theory advocates for increased
access and loyalty to users from search engines.' 74
Access necessarily requires the law to promote it.175 Regula-
tion, however, can threaten access. 176 Consider, for example, that
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id
165 Id. at 896.
1661d.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 896-97.
169 Id. at 897.
170 Id. at 898.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 901.
17s Id.
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because holocaust denial is prohibited in Germany and insulting the
king is prohibited in Thailand, "Google frequently removes links to
these and many other kinds of content when ordered to do so by lo-
cal authorities." 7 7 Such removal "directly inhibit[s] users' ability to
seek out the information they seek."' 78 When Baidu is required by
the Chinese government to block particular searches, it interferes
with basic preconditions of certain types of freedom. 79 Regulation
that limits a search engine's use "potentially degrades the quality of
advice users receive."o80 But regulation has its benefits as well; "the
government [can] take steps to ensure that users are affirmatively
able to make use of good and diverse search engines, helping to pro-
vide them if the market falls short."1 81 Accordingly, to ensure access,
regulation is a necessary evil with both positive and negative impli-
cations..
Loyalty also involves regulation, but it focuses on the rela-
tionship between users and search engines rather than the conduct
of the search engine.1 82 James Grimmelman describes this relation-
ship as "an inescapable information asymmetry."183 He explains,
"[T]he user knows more about what she wants, ... but the search en-
gine knows far more about whether anyone has put [the relevant
content] online."' 84 The result is "a distinctive possibility for disloy-
alty."' 85 Consider Grimmelman's example:
176Id.
177 Id
1 78 1d.
179 Id. at 901-02. For example, "Baidu blocks searches for information on Falun
Gong," a Chinese spiritual practice, "at the Chinese government's behest" be-
cause the Communist Party views it as a potential threat due to its size, inde-
pendence from the state, and spiritual teachings. Id. (citing Ed Felten, Chinese
Internet Censorship: See It for Yourself, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Apr. 28, 2009),
https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/chinese-internet-censorship-see-it-
yourself/; see also Seth Faison, In Beijing: A roar ofSilent Protestors, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 27, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/27/world/in-beijing-a-
roar-of-silent-protestors.html.
180 Grimmelman, supra note 9, at 902.
18 1 Id.
182 Id. at 903.
183 Id.
184 Id.
1ss Id.
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If I search for [discount dingos] and the search engine
tells me about OtterWorld and CapybaraCentral but
not DingoMart, it has frustrated my dingo-related
goals. Perhaps worse, if the search engine directs me
to DingoBarn because it earns an undisclosed 5%
commission on referrals, it has abused my trust to
enrich itself. It is precisely because the search engine
knows more than I do about websites that it can hide
what it knows from me, or deliberately steer me to
sites that serve its goals, not mine.186
This shows how "[t]he asymmetry is hard-wired into -search."187
The reliance on the search engine leaves the user susceptible to de-
ception. Under the advisor theory, the law can, however, "step in to
ensure [loyalty]" by "taking action against search engines that de-
ceive or manipulate, or coerce users."188
B. Preventing an Ex Machina Future
Currently, the power of search engines, as protected by the
First Amendment, is rapidly advancing beyond governmental con-
trol. This is due in large part to the fact that search engines are more
and more regularly able to rely on the editor theory, or editorial
judgment, to protect their actions.189 Under the editor theory, where
relevance to the user is subjectively determined by the search en-
gine, the search engine cannot produce false results. 190 As such,
courts like those in Search King and S. Louis Martin, will continue to
"conflate(] users' normative opinions about websites with search
engines' descriptive opinions about which websites users will find
relevant." 191 Distinguishing between these two different types of
186Id.
187Id.
188 Id.
'
89 See supra Part IV.
190 Grimmelman, supra note 9, at 924. Contrast this with the conduit theory,
which "regularly assert[s] that rankings are falsiflable because relevance is ob-
jective." Id. at 923.
191 Id. at 924.
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opinions is important because "the two kinds of opinions are pro-
tected speech for different reasons and to very different extents." 192
Normative opinions of users "are protected speech because
we have decided as a society to treat matters of taste and value as
questions of individual conscience rather than objective agree-
ment." 193 This notion "respects personal autonomy while promoting
social pluralism."1 94 Freedom of expression for descriptive purpos-
es, however, "is an instrumental goal: it helps encourage the creation
of better and more accurate knowledge about the world."1 95 Search
rankings fall into the latter category which "enjoy only . .. weaker,
more contingent protections."1 96 The advisor theory is able to filter
and distinguish between these two types of opinions to arrive at a
more exacting result. The current champion of the courts, the editor
theory, cannot filter and distinguish, but must resort to believing
that the search engine's opinion of relevance is infallible and thus en-
titled full First Amendment protections.
However, were a court to revisit S. Louis Martin1 97 or another
search bias case and apply the advisor theory rather than the editor
theory, the result would likely be the same. Martin would have to
prove that Google provided a subjectively dishonest result for the
ranking to be actionable in tort.198 The result in Martin's case would
be the same not because the court would again inadvertently con-
flate the two types of opinions present, but because "it will generally
be impossible for a court to conclude that Google's assertions of rel-
evance are wrong."' 99 This conclusion would result "because of the
diversity of users' (normative) opinions and the difficulty of measur-
ing them, rather than because of the expressivity of Google's (de-
scriptive) opinions."200
192 Id.
193Id
194 Id. at 925.
195 Id. at 925.
1961Id.
197 See supra Part III.B.
198 Grimmelman, supra note 9, at 925.
199 Id.20 0Id.
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It is possible however, that in cases challenging "search en-
gines' obligations in dealing with repressive authoritarian govern-
ments," 201 such-as Zhang, a different result could be reached under
the advisor theory. Some view the Zhang suit as nothing more than
"a political protest over Chinese censorship, [with] the battle . . . be-
ing waged by proxy against a private entity allegedly complying with
its government's laws."202 Those viewing Zhang as a mere proxy
battle argue that; rather than bringing "private lawsuit[s] against...
commercial actor[s]" to fix government censorship, "[b]etter mecha-
nisms would be to keep encouraging the Chinese government to re-
think its policies, and to encourage the development of pro-freedom
technologies that give ChineseInternet users more choices.' 203 They
note that, worse still, "the lawsuit's underlying objective [was] to ex-
port our free speech norms to China." 204 But this argument also fails
to view a search from the users' eyes; it follows the path of the editor
theory in viewing search from the search engine's perspective by ar-
guing that Baidu was "allegedly complying with its government's
laws."205 And when the plaintiffs in Zhang alleged that Baidu "con-
spire[d] to prevent 'pro-democracy political speech' from appearing
in its search-engine results here in the United States," they were not
attempting to "export our free speech norms to China," they were
seeking to enforce them here.206 The advisor theory could have of-
fered a more exacting result.
In Zhang, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York mistakenly applied the editor theory, discarded the conduit
theory, and disregarded the advisor theory's contention that the two
can coexist.207 When the court disregarded Turner's three-prong
201 Id. at 950.
202 Eric Goldman, Of Course the First Amendment Protect's Baidu's Search Engine,
Even When it Censors Pro-Democracy Results, FORBES (MAR 28, 2014, 03:31 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2014/03/28/of-course-the-first-
amendment-protects-baidus-search-engine-even-when-it-censors-pro-
democracy-results/.
2 03 Id.
204 Id.
20s Id.
206 Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 435 (S.D.N.Y 2014); Gold-
man, supra note 202, at 5.
207 See Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 436-38.
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analysis, it shunned the conduit theory. When it looked to Tornillo
and Hurley and determined that a "'search engine's editorial judg-
ment is much like many other familiar editorial judgments,' such as
the newspaper editor's judgment,"208 it accepted the editor theory
on its face and forgot that unlike newspapers, search engines are in-
teractive. While itmay be true that search engines exercise those
same editorial decisions, newspapers do not generate them "'on the
fly', in response to a [reader's] specific" interest at that exact mo-
ment the way search engines do.209 "Impulse. Response. Fluid. Im-
perfect. Patterned. Chaotic." 210 This simple difference makes the
analogy seem strained. Had the court been less eager to focus on
what the search engine was doing or saying, and placed more em-
phasis on how the users were searching, it could have promoted the
users' fundamental right to "seek" information, which involved more
than the "mere access to raw information, but also the ability to sort
through it."2 11
In the end though, the advisor theory, relying on some form
of regulation, is satisfied by the existence of other search engines by
which the plaintiffs in Zhang could find their publications online.
Even if the plaintiffs want their publications to appear on Baidu's
search results, the advisor theory is more concerned that "the gov-
ernment [can] take steps to ensure that users are affirmatively able
to make use of good and diverse search engines," not diverse results
on every search engine. 212 This notion accurately reflects that the
users' interest is put first, ensuring that the ability to seek infor-
mation is not hindered by a search engine's judgment. The availabil-
ity of a multitude of search engines adequately satisfies the advisor
theory's concern that users can sort through all of the raw infor-
mation that a search engine provides access to. The advisor theory
is not interested in compelling Baidu's speech in the interest of the
plaintiffs; it is concerned with the plaintiffs having some access to
the information they seek, whether through one advisor or another.
208 Id. at 437-38 (citing Benjamin, supra note 68, at 1458-72; Volokh & Falk,su-
pra note 45 at 884-92).
209 Grimmelman, supra note 9, at 895.
210 Ex MACHINA (Film4 & DNA Films 2015).
211 Grimmelman, supra note 9, at 897.
21 2 Id. at 902.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The most important point the advisor theory advocates is
that courts, too, put users' interests first when deciding cases involv-
ing First Amendment protections for search engine search results.
Now that oil has been struck, the internal combustion engine must
be properly designed to make use of it. To have the courts continue
to view First Amendment protections through the eyes of the search
engine is to always find for the search engine. Courts must begin to.
rein in the power of search engines by. considering search engine
speech through the eyes of the user and the user's opinion of what is
relevant. This is the only way an Ex Machina, all-powerful search en-
gine future can be prevented.
